Author Archives: mz

Abmahnungen i.Z. mit urheberrechtlich geschützten Bildern; unautorisierte Nutzung eines Bild nach URG Art. 2 Abs. 2 lit. g

Da ich auch Finanzanalytiker bin, finde ich manchmal gewisse nicht mit der Vermögensverwaltung direkt verwandte Themen spannend. Heute im Zusammenhang mit dem Urheberrecht.

Aktuell gibt es eine bekannte Zürcher Anwaltskanzlei mit Domizil an der Scheuchzerstrasse 64, die auf Vorrat Abmahnungen wegen “unautorisierte Nutzung eines Bildes” versendet. Sie vertritt die Interessen der Keystone AG und anderen grossen Bildagenturen wie Getty Images.

Die Anwaltskanzlei behauptet, dass angeblich urheberrechtswidrig Bilder genutzt werden und beruft sich auf Art. 2 Abs. 2 lit. g des Schweizerischen Urheberrechtsgesetzes (URG).

Wie mir ein Anwalt mitteilte: Längst nicht alle Bilder der Agenturen sind nach Schweizer Recht geschützt und überhaupt schützbar. Deshalb muss man jeden Fall separat anschauen, um beurteilen zu können, ob die Forderung der Agenturen berechtigt sind. Eine Konsultation eines Urheberrechtsspezialisten kostet aber Geld. Das wissen auch die Abmahner. Sie rechnen damit, dass die Adressaten lieber die Forderung zahlen als sich von einem Anwalt beraten zu lassen.

Das URG, welches an sich da wäre um Photographen zu schützen wird in der Praxis nun offenbar nur von grossen Agenturen genutzt um Bagatellfällen nachzugehen und Einschüchterung zu betreiben, auch wenn die Frage, ob das Werk wirklich urheberrechtlich geschützt ist mehr als fraglich ist (siehe auch PDF von Merz Law zum Thema generell). Dabei Nutzt die Anwaltskanzlei offenbar Programme, die das Internet nach Bildern absuchen. Diese Möglichkeit ist den meisten Photographen verwehrt, aufgrund der Kosten.

Falls Sie auch schon eine solche Abmahnung erhalten haben, schreiben Sie mir bitte an contact@zuberbuehler-associates.ch. Evtl. lässt sich die Praxis der Keystone AG durch vereintes Handeln auf ein gerechtfertigtes, vernünftiges Mass zurückbinden.

Gerne stelle ich den Interessierten auch das Abmahnschreiben per PDF zur Verfügung.

Siehe auch den Blog-Eintrag von Steiger Legal zum Thema Abmahnungen von Keystone AG.

Eine interessante Abhandlung und Information zum Thema Urheberrecht, dem nach URG geschützten Werk finden Sie bei Merz Law. Zum Beispiel folgende Passage:

Neben der schöpferischen Komponente ist für den Schutz durch das Urheberrecht von Bedeutung, ob diese Schöpfung individuellen Charakter aufweist. Entscheidend ist einzig, dass das Werk an sich individuell ist, dass mit anderen Worten mehrere Urheber in der gleichen Mitteilungsform nicht Gleiches schaffen würden.

Gerade das indiviudell sein, ist sicher oft nicht gegeben und damit problemlos anfechtbar.

 

Listed Swiss Property Fund List – Overview

For a client I recently compiled the following list of Swiss Property Funds;

Available as XLS and Immofonds PDF for download.

Name ISIN Marktkapit. In Mio. CHF * Ausschüttungs-rendite (%) Anlagefonds Agio Grundbesitz Kurs 30.04.17
UBS Swiss Sima CH0014420878 7’787.00 2.9 Gemischt 30.4 Indirekt 112
CS 1A Immo PK CH0008443035 3’959.00 3.5 Gemischt 24.9 Direkt 1500
CS Ref Siat CH0012913700 3’163.40 2.6 Wohnen 44.6 Indirekt 204.9
CS Ref Livingplus CH0031069328 2’857.00 2.4 Wohnen 32.7 Direkt 137
Cs Ref International CH0019685111 2’535.50 3.6 Ausland 16.9 Indirekt 1200
UBS Swiss Anfos CH0014420829 2’313.90 2.6 Wohnen 32.5 Indirekt 69.5
CS Ref Green Property CH0100778445 2’257.80 2.8 Nachhaltigk. 21.2 Direkt 132.9
CS Ref Interswiss CH0002769351 1’696.00 4.0 Geschäft 10.6 Indirekt 204.5
Swisscanto IFCA CH0037430946 1’527.90 2.4 Wohnen 41.8 Indirekt 144.9
Immofonds CH0009778769 1’529.00 2.8 Wohnen 57.9 Indirekt 475
UBS Sw Swissreal CH0014420886 1’561.50 3.9 Geschäft 13.7 Indirekt 68.25
La Fonciere CH0002782263 1’379.40 1.9 Wohnen 54.3 Gemischt 1115
Schroder Immoplus CH0007251413 1’323.80 2.5 Geschäft 33.0 Indirekt 1379
UBS Foncipars CH0014420852 1’230.00 2.7 Wohnen 33.7 Indirekt 95.9
FIR CH0014586710 1’247.00 2.0 Wohnen 48.6 Gemischt 193.8
Solvalor 61 CH0002785456 1’216.60 1.9 Wohnen 42.4 Direkt 270
Immo Helvetic CH0002770102 980.00 2.7 Wohnen 48.8 Indirekt 245
Rothschild Re Swiss CH0124238004 939.60 2.2 Wohnen 27.3 Direkt 140.6
Swissinvest Real CH0026168846 877.20 2.5 Wohnen 40.3 Direkt 181
Bonhote Immobilier CH0026725611 890.50 2.1 Wohnen 29.8 Indirekt 149.5
Realstone CH0039415010 849.10 2.5 Wohnen 27.2 Direkt 154
CS Ref Hospitality CH0118768057 824.20 3.2 Hospitality -2.0 Direkt 94.15
Procimmo CH0033624211 846.00 3.0 Geschäft 34.7 Direkt 175.2
Patrimonium CH0034995214 638.90 1.9 Wohnen 23.3 Direkt 155
UBS Direct Residential CH0026465366 604.10 2.2 Wohnen 40.9 Direkt 18.2
SF Sustainable Property CH0120791253 523.10 2.6 Wohnen 32.8 Direkt 148
Swisscanto Commercial CH0111959190 453.30 2.6 Gemischt 24.1 Direkt 126.5
UBS Direct Urban CH0192940390 378.70 1.9 Gemischt 17.2 Direkt 13.15
CS Ref Logisticsplus 2 CH0245633950 348.00 3.3 Logistik 13.4 Direkt 116
Polymen Fonds CH0107006550 337.80 2.2 Wohnen 27.2 Direkt 151
CS Ref Global CH0139851676 214.40 3.6 Ausland -1.6 Indirekt 92.8
Streetbox CH0037237630 183.10 2.9 Self Storage 76.6 Direkt 447.5
Residentia CH0100612339 160.90 2.3 Wohnen 18.5 Direkt 1347
SXI Real Estate Funds CH0009947406 40’393.70 2.7        

Zuwendungen bei Familienstiftungen: Was wird zugelassen – Beispiele

Immer wieder kommt es zur Fragestellung was nun eigentlich für Zuwendungen bei Familienstiftungen gegenüber der Steuerverwaltung als abzugsfähiger Geschäftsaufwand geltend gemacht werden können. Deshalb hier eine kurze Übersicht für Fälle wo Kinder im Vor- und Schulalter sind:

Was wird aufgerechnet (=nicht zugelassen)

  • Mietaufwand von Instrumenten
  • Haushalthilfe
  • Arztkosten
  • prinzipiell Zuwendungen an die Kinder bis und mit obligatorischer Schulzeit ohne Belege

Was wird zugelassen

  • Nachhilfe
  • Tennis-Unterricht
  • Golf-Unterricht
  • Musik-Unterricht
  • Ski-Unterricht
  • nur Erziehungskosten

ECB data shows Italy, France, Greece, Spain most active propping up their bond markets

Looking at this data showing central banks most active propping up bonds in the euro area and the comparing to what “pure play private banks” like Julius Baer hold on their balance sheet does make you wonder about the sustainability of the ECB purchases and what effect it has on the bond market.

central-bank-bond-buying-scale-size-2016-data

The data below shows what Julius Baer invests billions in. Especially debt instruments and there financial institution bonds caught my eye.

Julius Baer
Financial investments available-for-sale
Money market instruments 2’723.00 15.65%
Debt instruments 14’518.00 83.45%
Government and agency bonds 3’411.30 19.61%
Financial institution bonds 6’406.30 36.82%
Corporate bonds 4’649.40 26.73%
Other bonds 51.00 0.29%
of which quoted 13’532.50 77.79%
of which unquoted 985.50 5.66%
Equity instruments 155.80 0.90%
of which quoted 16.10 0.09%
of which unquoted 139.70 0.80%
17’396.80

UBS Results: The Headwinds and The Green Shoots

ubs-income-statement-2q16-2016

The interest rate environment is dampening the business model which relies on “net interest income” , as can clearly be seen above (marked red). Luckily for banks in general and UBS in particular,  loyal customers aren’t putting stronger pressure on fees and commissions.

Own fund business schrinking and lighter customer activity are lowering commissions slight as can be seen in “net fee and commission income”.

A noteworthy positive is the “net trading income” especially as the impact from own credit, that had inflated the result last year QoQ.

Looking at the business divisions UBS has the investement bank and the americas wealth management that are not as profitable or safe as the personal & corporate banking or wealth management units. Also the investment is made to look better by transferring costs out to corporate center. It is inherently riskier and disguised. Asset management is also not especially profitable.

ubs-2q16-2016-results

Credit Suisse underlying business – 2Q16 results

You can’t be much else than shocked by the dramatic revenue drops.

This is the unfiltered story, no PR-talk, no salesman talk, just facts and figures:

Credit Suisse
2Q16 1Q16 2Q15 Down
Net interest income 1’999 2’011 2’869 -30.32%
Commission and fees 2’796 2’675 3’259 -14.21%
Trading revenues 94 -271 498 -81.12%
Other revenues 219 223 329 -33.43%
   

Then compare it to expenses:

All small moves.

Compensation and benefits 2’734 2’482 2’914 -6.18%
General and administrative expenses 1’760 1’848 1’928 -8.71%
Commission expenses 352 387 406 -13.30%
Restructuring expenses 91 255 0

Further important problems:

  • Strategic Resolution Unit (SRU) is a huge black hole for revenues and at the same time costs a lot to run, especially “other operating expenses”.
  • Swiss Universal Bank (SUB) and International Wealth Management are running with decent margin, especially when compared to Global Markets which is very expensive to run. Probably to many “screen watchers” in London, NY etc…

credit-suisse-strategic-resolution-unit

What is an especially large challenge as an outsider; understanding what is in the Strategic Resolution Unit (SRU) and how is it performing.

Some info from the 1H16 report:

credit-suisse-strategic-resolution-unit-2

The bloodsuckers are

  • the investment banking portfolio which somehow manages to have negative revenue (always a good sign if your assets are working against you).
  • the funding costs

Pure Play Swiss Private Bank (Julius Baer – Vontobel)

In the H1 report Julius Baer is described as a pure play private bank. That’s why I thought it may be useful for discussions to know what this business model entails. Where do the profits in a pure play private bank come from?

According to my calculations **

22% from interest income (8% at Vontobel)

38% from management and fund fees (55% at Vontobel)

16% from commission (~client trading) (12% at Vontobel)

18% from trading (mainly FX trading) (25% at Vontobel ***)

4% from structured products (guesstimate)  * ( ***probably 5% from trading at Vontobel belong here…)

  • * 4% of the AuM at Vontobel are in structured products; 5% at Julius Baer

If we split the Vontobel business modell we see that

18% is Private Banking

57% is Asset Management

20% is Investment Banking

5% is External Asset Managers

 

**

1 Interest income 393.90
2 Interest expense -86.40
3 LOANS       307.5 22.94% 22.50%
4 Advisory and management commissions 433.10  
5 Investment fund fees 87.00  
6 MGMT FEES & FUND FEES     520.1 520.1 38.80% 38.05%
7 Brokerage commissions 251.00  
8 Other commissions 60.60  
9 311.6  
10 Commission expense -96.5  
11 COMMISSIONS       215.1 16.05% 15.74%
12 Trading income FX 229.80 229.8 17.14% 16.81%
13 Trading income Debt Instruments 14.20 14.2 1.06% 1.04%
14  
15 Trading income Equity instruments -126.40  
16 Dividend income on trading portfolios 180.20  
17 STRUCTURED PRODUCTS (partially)       53.8 4.01% 3.94%
18 Total of all the selected above 1340.5
19 Total according to H1 Report 1366.9

julius-baer-net-commission-and-fee-income julius-baer-net-interest-and-dividend-income julius-baer-net-trading-income

Julius Baer Structured Products & Dividend Games Very Profitable, Only in H1 Always

I find it rather interesting that dividend income from trading portfolios (CHF 180m, 121.9) and net trading losses on equity instruments (CHF 126m ; CHF 104m) only happen during the swiss dividend paying season. The profit margin between the dividend income on trading portfolios and the equity losses on trading are 15-30%. As a sidenote: withholding tax is 35%. Also: Dividends in Switzerland are mainly in H1. The dividend trading income and realised trading losses seem to be related to the swiss dividend paying cycle. If Julius Baer was doing trading with US equities for dividends they would be more evenely distributed throughout the year. However H2 never seems to have large fluctuations.

This could lead to a suspicous mind concluding that tax circumenventing in some form or other is taking place. Likely it is legal of course…

The official explanation (and one that makes a lot of sense):

The dividends come from equity securities that are held as a hedge in conjunction with structured products. 

This would also mean that most or all of the negative net trading income from equity instruments is in fact just marked to market securities held for trading.

It does show you that the structured products division of Julius Baer is rather important.  

Check out “Dividend income on trading portfolios”

julius-baer-net-interest-and-dividend-income Check out losses on “Equity Instruments”julius-baer-net-trading-income

Credit Suisse credit agency ratings – near problem area?

credit-suisse-rating-comparison_2016_holding-companies

The comparison below is interesting for short-term ratings. Credit Suisse and SocGen would lose the A1 Short Term rating with the next step. Now why is this important? Many multi-billion pension funds are forced to move their liquidity from banks that lose the A1 Short Term rating. That will mean a drain on liquidity, which in turn leads to furth problems. Also the rating impact by itself can already cost hundreds of millions in extra costs. This would be another drag on how safe Credit Suisse is.

credit-suisse-rating-comparison_2016

Credit Suisse business model flaws – high interest costs

Outstanding capital insturments of Credit Suisse according to this presentation.

According to my calculations (see table below) Credit Suisse pays over CHF 1 bn per year in interest rate costs alone. The coupon they need to pay is high. High risks demand high coupon.

So much profit has to be generated to just cover fixed costs. At the same time more and more peer-to-peer lending business models are springing up, robo-advisors, strong global competition. The Credit Suisse business model seems very challenging, that’s what the stock price and also credit rating tells you.

Do cantonal banks have these costs? Their share prices seem to be saying they have a lower cost and lower risk business model.  Makes you wonder why customers should even bother having assets with a riskier, negative news-flow company.

Table of AT (Additional Tier) 1 instruments:

Currency Nominal in m iCoupon Interest pa CHF interest
USD 2000 6.50% 130.0 128.05
EUR 1250 5.75% 71.9 77.98
CHF 290 6.00% 17.4 17.40
USD 2250 7.50% 168.8 166.22
USD 2500 6.25% 156.3 153.91
USD 2000 7.88% 157.5 155.14
CHF 750 7.13% 53.4 53.44
CHF 2500 9.00% 225.0 225.00
USD 1720 9.50% 163.4 160.95
USD 1725 9.50% 163.9 161.42
CHF 390 0.00% 0.0
as of Q1 2016 1307.49 1299.50
as of Q3 2016 1149.99 1144.36
USDCHF 0.9850
EURCHF 1.0850

FINMA could save Credit Suisse a billion by invoking their right:

Credit Suisse will be prohibited from making any AT1 interest payment if:

– Distributable profits are less than the aggregate amount of AT1 interest payments

– FINMA prohibited such interest payment

– Minimum regulatory requirements are not met